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CONSTITUTIONAL TORTS, OVER-DETERRENCE AND 
SUPERVISORY LIABILITY AFTER IQBAL 
by 
Sheldon Nahmod* 
In Ashcroft v. Iqbal, the Court conditioned supervisory liability under 
§ 1983 and Bivens on direct constitutional violations by supervisors. 
This decision conflicts with the causation approach, under which 
supervisory liability could be based on the causal link between the 
supervisor’s knowledge of unconstitutional conduct by the supervisor’s 
subordinates and the plaintiff’s constitutional injuries—which was 
conceded by the defendants in Iqbal and was the prevailing standard in 
the circuits prior to the decision in that case. In this Article, I explore the 
Court’s growing concern with over-deterrence of government officials in 
§ 1983 and Bivens cases, and describe how it led to this substantive 
change in the law of supervisory liability. I discuss the standard in the 
circuits prior to Iqbal and explain why the constitutional approach 
adopted in Iqbal is the better one based on the language and legislative 
history of § 1983, as well as relevant policy considerations. I also 
address the deficiencies of the Iqbal decision and argue that the 
constitutional approach may not improve the over-deterrence problem. 
Finally, I analyze the inconsistencies between Iqbal and other § 1983 
cases, but conclude that, in spite of its flaws, Iqbal got supervisory 
liability right. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Ashcroft v. Iqbal1 is obviously an extremely important federal pleading 
decision. But it is significant for another, perhaps less obvious, reason: 
the Court’s conditioning of supervisory liability under both § 19832 and 
Bivens3—Iqbal involved Bivens-type claims—on constitutional violations by 
supervisors themselves. This substantive limitation, which I here call the 
“constitutional approach,”4 was seemingly the product of little or no legal 
analysis and was, moreover, created by the Court without briefing and 
argument. Also, it flew in the face of a concession on the record by the 
defendants in Iqbal—former U.S. Attorney General John Ashcroft and 
 
1 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009). 
2 Section 1983 reads as follows: “Every person who, under color of any statute, 
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of 
Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or 
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, 
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the 
party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for 
redress, except that in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or 
omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted 
unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. For the 
purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of 
Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.” 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983 (2006). Section 1983 is the subject of my three-volume treatise. SHELDON H. 
NAHMOD, CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES LITIGATION: THE LAW OF SECTION 1983 (4th 
ed. 2009) [hereinafter CIVIL LIBERTIES LITIGATION]. 
3 Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 
388 (1971) (Court held that a Fourth Amendment damages action was available 
against federal law enforcement officers). 
4 In an early article on this topic, I called this approach the “Fourteenth 
Amendment approach.” Sheldon H. Nahmod, Constitutional Accountability in Section 
1983 Litigation, 68 IOWA L. REV. 1, 15 n.93 (1982) [hereinafter Nahmod, Constitutional 
Accountability]. I use the same terminology in Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Litigation. 1 
CIVIL LIBERTIES LITIGATION, supra note 2, § 3:97. But here I call it the “constitutional 
approach” because it covers Bivens actions as well as § 1983, and is therefore broader 
than the Fourteenth Amendment standing alone. 
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F.B.I. Director Robert Mueller—that supervisory liability could be based 
on the causal link between their actual knowledge of, and deliberate 
indifference to, the unconstitutional conduct of their subordinates and 
the plaintiff’s constitutional injuries.5 I call this the “causation 
approach,”6 the prevailing standard in the circuits for supervisory liability 
before Iqbal was handed down.7 
The precise substantive issue decided by the Court in Iqbal can be 
illustrated by the following hypothetical. Suppose that employees in a 
state or local government licensing office regularly discriminate on racial 
grounds in the awarding of licenses. Suppose further that their 
supervisors are actually aware of this racial discrimination but are 
deliberately indifferent to it and therefore do little or nothing to stop it. 
It is clear that the employees have violated equal protection and are 
therefore liable under § 1983, but what of the supervisors?  
According to the Court in Iqbal, the supervisors can only be liable 
under § 1983 if it is proved that they themselves had the purposeful 
discriminatory intent required for an equal protection violation.8 Their 
actual knowledge and deliberate indifference may be relevant to an 
evidentiary finding of purposeful discrimination, but, if purposeful 
discrimination is not proved, then the supervisors have not themselves 
violated equal protection and are therefore not liable under § 1983 
 
5 The lack of briefing and argument, together with defendants’ concession, is 
noted and discussed by Justice Souter, joined by Justices Stevens, Ginsburg and 
Breyer, in his dissent. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1956–57. I contend later that the Court 
nevertheless got it right when it adopted the constitutional approach. See discussion 
infra Part IV. 
6 I call this the “causation approach” because it is grounded on the causal link 
between a supervisory defendant’s deliberate indifference—a state of mind not based 
on any particular constitutional provision—and the subordinate’s violation of the 
plaintiff’s constitutional rights. In Constitutional Accountability, I similarly called it the 
“causation approach.” Nahmod, Constitutional Accountability, supra note 4, at 15.  
 However, in §§ 3:98 and 6:50 of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Litigation, I called it, 
perhaps misleadingly, the “negligence/causation approach.” 1 & 2 CIVIL LIBERTIES 
LITIGATION, supra note 2, §§ 3:98, 6:50. This latter terminology was based on the 
concurring opinion of Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Marshall and Blackmun, in 
City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808 (1985), a local government failure to train 
decision handed down before City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989), discussed 
below. In Tuttle, Justice Brennan maintained that there could be local government 
liability for failure to train for “a policy or custom that would foreseeably and 
avoidably cause an individual to be subjected to deprivation of a constitutional right.” 
Tuttle, 471 U.S. at 832. This is classic negligence language. Subsequently, in Harris, 
the Court as a matter of § 1983 statutory interpretation rejected negligence as the 
state of mind for local government failure to train liability and instead settled on 
deliberate indifference. Harris, 489 U.S. at 388. See infra text accompanying notes 14–
16. 
7 It must be emphasized that the constitutional and causation approaches are 
matters of statutory interpretation with respect to § 1983, and are matters of federal 
common law with respect to Bivens. 
8 Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949. 
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under the constitutional approach.9 This departed from the causation 
approach consensus in the circuits that deliberate indifference together 
with actual knowledge was enough for supervisory liability, assuming that 
the subordinates violated the Constitution.10 In a very real sense, the 
theoretical difference between the constitutional approach and the 
causation approach is all about the source of the fault required for 
supervisory liability: is that source exclusively the relevant constitutional 
provision or is it also § 1983 itself? 
I propose to situate Iqbal in the context of § 1983 and Bivens 
jurisprudence and to describe how the Court’s increasing concern with 
over-deterrence11 of government officials in § 1983 and Bivens litigation 
has led in the past several decades to major pro-defendant changes in 
such litigation. This concern has migrated from its traditional location, 
the affirmative defense of individual immunities (absolute and qualified 
immunity),12 through the constitutional merits, and now to pleading 
itself. Furthermore, Iqbal’s adoption of the constitutional approach 
suggests that the same concern with over-deterrence is responsible for 
this substantive change in the law of supervisory liability under § 1983 
and Bivens.13 
The Court’s constitutional approach to supervisory liability in Iqbal is 
one that I initially advocated over twenty-five years ago for both 
supervisory liability and local government liability.14 This was seven years 
before the Court handed down City of Canton v. Harris, which announced 
a deliberate indifference standard for local government liability for 
failure to train as a matter of § 1983 interpretation.15 Harris explicitly 
adopted the causation approach, contrary to my earlier position.16 
Prompted by Iqbal, I revisit that position here but again conclude that the 
 
9 Id. 
10 See infra Part III.B. 
11 By “over-deterrence” I mean the more than optimal deterrence of, and 
interference with, the independent decision-making of state and local government 
officials as well as federal officials. Where there is optimal deterrence, only 
unconstitutional conduct is deterred; where there is over-deterrence, constitutional 
conduct is deterred as well. For a good example of the application of economic 
analysis to individual immunities, see Ronald A. Cass, Damage Suits Against Public 
Officers, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 1110, 1118 (1981). See generally Daryl J. Levinson, Making 
Government Pay: Markets, Politics, and the Allocation of Constitutional Costs, 67 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 345 (2000) (criticized in Bernard P. Dauenhauer & Michael L. Wells, Corrective 
Justice and Constitutional Torts, 35 GA. L. REV. 903, 904 (2001)). 
12 See generally 2 CIVIL LIBERTIES LITIGATION, supra note 2, chs. 7–8 (on absolute 
immunity and qualified immunity, respectively). 
13 As discussed later, this concern will not invariably be advanced under the 
constitutional approach. See infra Part IV.B. 
14 Nahmod, Constitutional Accountability, supra note 4, at 21–32. 
15 City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989). 
16 After Harris was handed down, I acknowledged in earlier editions of my 
treatise that it was contrary to the constitutional approach I advocated. See 1 CIVIL 
LIBERTIES LITIGATION, supra note 2, §§ 3:99, 6:50 (on supervisory liability and local 
government liability, respectively). 
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constitutional approach to supervisory liability remains the better one. 
For all its process flaws, Iqbal got supervisory liability right. 
This Article is divided into the following parts. In Part II, I survey 
relevant aspects of the law of § 1983 and Bivens. Painting with a broad 
brush and for the most part descriptively, I maintain that the Court’s 
concern with over-deterrence has increasingly dominated constitutional 
torts. In Part III, I address the relevance of that concern for supervisory 
liability, set out what the Court said about supervisory liability in Iqbal, 
and very briefly summarize the pre-Iqbal circuit consensus on supervisory 
liability. In Part IV, I delve more deeply into the nature of supervisory 
liability and conclude that the Court, although without any real analysis, 
reached the correct result in Iqbal. Section 1983’s legislative history, its 
language, and, especially, policy considerations all cut in favor of the 
constitutional approach under which it is the relevant constitutional 
provision that supplies the requisite state of mind, or fault. However, to 
the extent that Iqbal’s adoption of the constitutional approach to 
supervisory liability was motivated by a concern with over-deterrence, I 
argue that this concern will not necessarily be advanced. It all depends 
on the particular constitutional violation.  
Finally, I address the glaring inconsistency between Iqbal’s 
constitutional approach and Harris’s deliberate indifference standard for 
§ 1983 local government liability for failure to train.17 The Court in Harris 
explicitly and incorrectly grounded this standard on the causation 
approach under which the requisite state of mind, or fault, is supplied by 
§ 1983.18 Local government liability under § 1983 must, of course, be 
based on an official policy or custom which, when implemented by local 
government officials or employees, causes a constitutional deprivation.19 
But the official policy or custom requirement is really all about 
constitutional accountability and should instead have been grounded on 
the constitutional approach.20 
 
17 The Court may one day have to confront this inconsistency. See discussion infra 
Part IV.D. 
18 Harris, 489 U.S. at 388. 
19 Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690–91, 694 (1978) (according to 
the Court, what is required for § 1983 local government liability is that the “execution 
[by local government officials] of a government’s policy or custom, whether made by 
its law makers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official 
policy, inflicts the injury”). 
20 See Nahmod, Constitutional Accountability, supra note 4, at 24–29. See also 2 CIVIL 
LIBERTIES LITIGATION, supra note 2, § 6:50. 
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II. CONSTITUTIONAL TORTS AND AVOIDING OVER-
DETERRENCE 
A. Avoiding Over-Deterrence Has Increasingly Become a Major Factor in § 1983
 and Bivens Jurisprudence 
Constitutional tort litigation has, from the beginning, been animated 
by various factors.21 From a plaintiff’s perspective, compensation and 
deterrence factors are inherent in the primary purpose of § 1983 as a 
matter of statutory interpretation: the enforcement of the Fourteenth 
Amendment through damages liability.22 These are also inherent in the 
birth of Bivens claims against federal officials.23 So, too, is the punitive 
factor in the § 1983 and Bivens settings, at least as to individual liability.24 
Structural considerations are similarly implicated in § 1983 and Bivens 
litigation: federalism in the one case and separation of powers in the 
other. Federalism is implicated in § 1983 litigation because it is federal 
courts that, through damages liability, enforce this federal legislation and 
the Fourteenth Amendment against state and local government officials 
and local governments (but not states), thereby intervening in, second-
guessing, and affecting their decision-making processes. Separation of 
powers is implicated in Bivens litigation because federal courts, in the 
absence of legislation and through their own creation of Bivens damages 
 
21 See generally 1 CIVIL LIBERTIES LITIGATION, supra note 2, §§ 1:5–1:9. 
22 Section 1983 began as § 1 of the Ku Klux Clan Act of 1871, enacted by 
Congress pursuant to Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Its purpose appears 
in the title: “An Act to enforce the Provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
Constitution of the United States, and for other Purposes.” Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871, 
ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13 (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006)).  
 The Supreme Court explained in Mitchum v. Foster: “The very purpose of § 1983 
was to interpose the federal courts between the States and the people, as guardians of 
the people’s federal rights—to protect the people from unconstitutional action 
under color of state law, ‘whether that action be executive, legislative, or judicial.’” 
Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242 (1972) (quoting Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 
346 (1880)). 
23 As the Court stated in Bivens: “That damages may be obtained for injuries 
consequent upon a violation of the Fourth Amendment by federal officials should 
hardly seem a surprising proposition. Historically, damages have been regarded as 
the ordinary remedy for an invasion of personal interests in liberty. Of course, the 
Fourth Amendment does not in so many words provide for its enforcement by an 
award of money damages for the consequences of its violation. But ‘it is . . . well 
settled that where legal rights have been invaded, and a federal statute provides for a 
general right to sue for such invasion, federal courts may use any available remedy to 
make good the wrong done.’ The present case involves no special factors counseling 
hesitation in the absence of affirmative action by Congress.” Bivens v. Six Unknown 
Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 395–96 (1971) (citations 
omitted) (quoting Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946)). 
24 See Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 48–49 (1983) (setting out a reckless or callous 
indifference standard for punitive damages liability; malice or evil intent is not 
required). However, local governments are not liable for punitive damages. City of 
Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 271 (1981). See generally 1 CIVIL LIBERTIES 
LITIGATION, supra note 2, §§ 4:39–4:63 (on § 1983 punitive damages). 
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remedies, are enforcing the constitution against federal officials (typically 
executive officials).25 
From a defendant’s perspective, two additional factors—conserving 
federal judicial resources and avoiding trivializing constitutional rights—
emerge particularly in connection with the threshold inquiry into 
whether a § 1983 or Bivens plaintiff has even stated a cause of action. This 
is especially apparent in the substantive due process and Eighth 
Amendment areas where the Court has used state of mind requirements 
to perform an important gatekeeper function of keeping what it 
considers to be trivial constitutional claims out of court.26 To the extent 
that this also means that § 1983 and Bivens should not become fonts of 
tort law, federalism and separation of powers are implicated here as 
well.27 
Of particular relevance for present purposes is avoiding over-
deterrence of individuals. This factor made an early § 1983 appearance 
in Tenney v. Brandhove,28 an absolute legislative immunity decision handed 
down a decade before the seminal decision in Monroe v. Pape.29 Avoiding 
over-deterrence in the absolute immunity setting, meaning minimizing 
not only the costs of liability but the costs of defending (including 
discovery), has also become prominent in the qualified immunity setting, 
particularly since 1982 when the Court handed down Harlow v. Fitzgerald 
and significantly changed qualified immunity jurisprudence.30 
 
25 As Justice Harlan, concurring in Bivens, observed: “the question is whether the 
power to authorize damages as a judicial remedy for the vindication of a federal 
constitutional right is placed by the Constitution itself exclusively in Congress’ 
hands.” Bivens, 403 U.S. at 400–02. 
26 For example, in County of Sacramento v. Lewis, the Court ratcheted up the state 
of mind required for law enforcement officer liability in high-speed pursuit cases 
from deliberate indifference to purpose to cause harm. 523 U.S. 833, 836 (1998). The 
Court did the same in the Eighth Amendment area when it ratcheted up the state of 
mind required for liability of corrections officials in prison security cases from 
deliberate indifference to malicious and sadistic intent to harm. Whitley v. Albers, 475 
U.S. 312, 320–21 (1986). It should be noted that the Court was also concerned with 
over-deterrence in these cases. See discussion infra at Part II.C. 
27 Ensuring that § 1983 does not become a “font of tort law” is a familiar trope. 
See, e.g., Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701 (1976). 
28 341 U.S. 367 (1951) (discussed in 2 CIVIL LIBERTIES LITIGATION, supra note 2, 
§ 7:3). Tenney interpreted § 1983 against a background of common law immunity. Id. 
at 372, 376. 
29 365 U.S. 167 (1961). 
30 457 U.S. 800 (1982). Harlow, a Bivens case, eliminated the subjective part of the 
qualified immunity test and set out an objective unreasonableness test, so as to 
eliminate what the Court called “frivolous” or “insubstantial” claims and to minimize 
over-deterrence. Id. at 808. See 2 CIVIL LIBERTIES LITIGATION, supra note 2, §§ 8:4–8:5 
(for an analysis of Harlow). 
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B. Individual Immunities: The Traditional Location for Avoiding Over-
 Deterrence 
There are three categories of privileged § 1983 and Bivens individual 
defendants who are, by virtue of both common law immunity rules and 
policy considerations, absolutely immune from damages liability: 
legislators for the performance of legislative functions, judges for the 
performance of judicial functions, and prosecutors for the performance 
of advocative functions.31 When an individual defendant successfully 
asserts absolute immunity, he or she is out of the case at that point even if 
all of the allegations in the complaint are taken as true (that the 
defendant violated the plaintiff’s constitutional rights and caused harm). 
The primary policy concern is that the functions performed are so very 
important that we do not want this defendant—often high profile—to be 
worried about the possibility of being sued rather than focusing on 
making the difficult decisions that he or she is supposed to make. In 
other words, the primary policy concern is the avoidance of over-
deterrence of the individual defendant. This goes well beyond a concern 
with the chilling effect of potential liability on individual decision-making 
(the costs of liability): it extends to the chilling effect of the very possibility 
of being sued on individual decision-making (the costs of defending) and, 
as such, is a quite powerful affirmative defense. To repeat, absolute 
immunity protects the individual even though all would agree that the 
plaintiff’s constitutional rights were violated.32 
This concern with the chilling effect that the possibility of being 
sued has on decision-making—and thus with the costs of defending 
(including discovery)—now drives not only absolute immunity but 
qualified immunity as well. Originally, qualified immunity had both an 
objective and subjective part and protected solely against liability.33 It was, 
in most respects, a conventional affirmative defense. However, beginning 
 
31 See generally 2 CIVIL LIBERTIES LITIGATION, supra note 2, §§ 7:11–7:41, 7:42–7:62 
(on judicial immunity and prosecutorial immunity, respectively). The President of 
the United States is the only executive official who is absolutely immune from 
damages liability for his unconstitutional official conduct. Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 
U.S. 731, 757 (1982). 
32 Absolute immunity, when applied to a defendant’s unconstitutional conduct, 
means that the plaintiff has to bear the costs of his or her constitutional injury. I have 
argued elsewhere that this result is often inconsistent with corrective justice, a 
concept that is Aristotelian in origin and means the remedying of harm caused to one 
person by the wrongful conduct of another. Corrective justice also has Kantian 
aspects insofar as it is based on the equal dignity of persons. See Sheldon Nahmod, 
From the Courtroom to the Street: Court Orders and Section 1983, 29 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 
613, 613, 615–16, 638–40 (2002) [hereinafter Nahmod, Courtroom to Street]. See also 
Dauenhauer & Wells, supra note 11; Ernest J. Weinrib, Corrective Justice, 77 IOWA L. 
REV. 403 (1992); Richard W. Wright, The Principles of Justice, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
1859 (2000). See generally PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW (David G. Owen 
ed., 1995) (on corrective justice). 
33 See, e.g., Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 555 (1967). 
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in 1982 with Harlow v. Fitzgerald,34 continuing through Mitchell v. Forsyth35 
in 1985, and culminating in Pearson v. Callahan36 in 2009, the Court 
gradually transformed qualified immunity into the functional equivalent 
of absolute immunity. Harlow eliminated the subjective part of qualified 
immunity and instructed courts to decide qualified immunity (whether 
raised by motion to dismiss or for summary judgment) before discovery.37 
Thereafter, the Court modified the final judgment requirement for 
appeals and, in Mitchell, allowed interlocutory appeals from district court 
denials of qualified immunity defense motions for summary judgment, at 
least on issues of law.38 Finally, the Court in Pearson retreated from its 
prior insistence that district courts deciding qualified immunity motions 
must always rule on the constitutional merits first.39 The Court restored 
the flexibility of district courts to decide cases for defendants on qualified 
immunity grounds, if they wished to do so. 
In these qualified immunity cases and others, the Court made clear 
that it was particularly concerned with the costs of defending against 
frivolous or insubstantial § 1983 and Bivens claims, and with weeding out 
such claims before discovery and trial.40 And whatever one thinks of this 
transformation of qualified immunity into the functional equivalent of 
absolute immunity, it must be acknowledged that the traditional location 
of a concern with avoiding over-deterrence is indeed in the individual 
immunity-affirmative defense setting. This is where the interest of society 
in independent decision-making by government officials—an 
instrumental consideration analytically distinct from the constitutional 
merits—has been taken account of in § 1983 and Bivens jurisprudence. 
As it turns out, though, the concern with avoiding over-deterrence under 
 
34 457 U.S. 800 (1982). 
35 472 U.S. 511 (1985). 
36 129 S. Ct. 808 (2009). 
37 Harlow, 457 U.S. at 808. Harlow was slightly modified with respect to discovery 
in Anderson v. Creighton. 483 U.S. 635, 646 (1987) (discussed at 2 CIVIL LIBERTIES 
LITIGATION, supra note 2, § 8:12). 
38 Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 527. 
39 Pearson, 129 S. Ct. at 820–22. The Court had so insisted in cases such as Saucier 
v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001). 
40 The Court explained in Harlow as follows: “We therefore hold that government 
officials performing discretionary functions, generally are shielded from liability for 
civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or 
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. Reliance on 
the objective reasonableness of an official’s conduct, as measured by reference to 
clearly established law, should avoid excessive disruption of government and permit 
the resolution of many insubstantial claims on summary judgment.” Harlow, 457 U.S. 
at 818 (citations omitted). 
 In Constitutional Damages and Corrective Justice: A Different View, I argued that 
Harlow’s shift to objective reasonableness was based almost exclusively on 
instrumental considerations and that § 1983 liability should be grounded on the 
wrongdoing or fault inherent in the underlying constitutional violation. Sheldon 
Nahmod, Constitutional Damages and Corrective Justice: A Different View, 76 VA. L. REV. 
997, 1004–06 (1990) [hereinafter Nahmod, Constitutional Damages]. 
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§ 1983 and Bivens has migrated to constitutional analysis, particularly 
where § 1983 and Bivens damages liability is implicated, and now, in Iqbal, 
to pleading. 
C. The Constitutional Merits 
It has been clear for some time now that the possibility of damages 
liability under § 1983 and Bivens, and its feared impact on the 
independence of public official decision-making, have affected the scope 
of certain constitutional provisions. A good early example is Parratt v. 
Taylor, a § 1983 prisoner case seeking damages for lost property, which 
held, as a matter of procedural due process, that where the challenged 
negligent conduct is random and unauthorized, there is no procedural 
due process violation so long as there is an adequate state post-
deprivation remedy.41 Parratt was later overruled in part by Daniels v. 
Williams, another prisoner case—this one involving personal injury—
which held that negligence was not enough for a “deprivation” of liberty 
and ratcheted up the state of mind required for all due process violations 
to “abuse of [government] power.”42 Both Parratt and Daniels modified 
due process law for everyone, but they were motivated in large measure by 
the Court’s concern that prison officials would otherwise be over-
deterred by excessive § 1983 prisoner litigation.43 
The Court has even more explicitly manipulated state of mind 
requirements out of a concern with over-deterrence in § 1983 substantive 
due process high-speed police chase cases. Thus, the Court held in 
County of Sacramento v. Lewis that the state of mind required for a 
substantive due process violation is not deliberate indifference but rather 
“purpose to cause harm.”44 In this setting, where police officers do not 
have time to deliberate, only the purpose to do harm constitutes 
conscience-shocking conduct, according to the Court.45 Similarly, in the 
§ 1983 Eighth Amendment setting the Court declared in Whitley v. Albers 
that while the typical state of mind requirement for an Eighth 
Amendment violation by prison officials in connection with conditions of 
confinement is deliberate indifference,46 in prison security cases the state 
 
41 451 U.S. 527, 543 (1981), overruled in part by Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 
330–31 (1986). Cf. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701 (1976) (Court, concerned with 
making § 1983 a “font of tort law,” held that an individual’s interest in reputation, 
standing alone, is not a liberty interest for procedural due process purposes). 
42 Daniels, 474 U.S. at 332. 
43 That Parratt limited procedural due process protection for everyone was 
troublesome if the Court’s motivation was to minimize the over-deterrence of prison 
officials. Note that the latter goal is now implemented by the Prison Litigation 
Reform Act of 1995, which significantly limits § 1983 claims by prisoners. Pub. L. 104-
134, 110 Stat. 1321-66 (1996) (codified in scattered sections of 11, 18, 28 & 42 U.S.C.) 
44 523 U.S. 833, 836 (1998) (discussed in 1 CIVIL LIBERTIES LITIGATION, supra note 
2, § 3:52). 
45 523 U.S. at 853. 
46 475 U.S. 312, 327 (1986). 
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of mind required is “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.”47 The 
Court explained that in such cases prison officials needed to act quickly 
and that they needed a margin for error in order to promote 
independent decision-making.48 
But two recent § 1983 public employment cases are even more 
striking than the preceding examples. The Court, concerned with over-
deterrence, has used a categorical approach to exclude altogether the 
applicability of the relevant constitutional provisions, in one case the First 
Amendment and in the other the Equal Protection Clause. In Garcetti v. 
Ceballos, the Court revisited a thirty-year old precedent and ruled that the 
First Amendment is inapplicable to employer discipline directed at 
public employees for speech arising from their employment duties.49 And 
in Engquist v. Oregon Department of Agriculture, the Court unpersuasively 
distinguished a prior decision holding that class-of-one equal protection 
claims are actionable, and held that the Equal Protection Clause simply 
does not apply where a public employee, attempting to make such a class-
of-one claim, alleges that an employer discriminated against him or her 
arbitrarily or capriciously.50 In both cases, the Court used a categorical 
balancing approach and gave great weight to what it considered the 
adverse impact of judicial intervention, potential liability, and the costs of 
defending on independent decision-making in public employment.51 
D. Pleading and Iqbal 
Against this background it should not be surprising that Iqbal 
extended the new “plausibility” pleading standard of Bell Atlantic Corp. v. 
 
47 Id.; see also Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976). Thereafter, Farmer v. Brennan 
declared that deliberate indifference in the Eighth Amendment setting means 
subjective criminal recklessness. 511 U.S. 825, 839–40 (1994) (discussed in 1 CIVIL 
LIBERTIES LITIGATION, supra note 2, § 3:32). 
48 Whitley, 475 U.S. at 320. 
49 547 U.S. 410, 426 (2006). For analysis, see Sheldon H. Nahmod, Public Employee 
Speech, Categorical Balancing and § 1983: A Critique of Garcetti v. Ceballos, 42 U. RICH. L. 
REV. 561 (2008). 
50 128 S. Ct. 2146, 2153–55 (2008) (this case distinguished Vill. of Willowbrook v. 
Olech, 528 U.S. 562 (2000) (per curiam)). 
51 Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 422–23; Engquist, 128 S. Ct. at 2154. The deep question of 
whether, and under what circumstances, it is appropriate to take over-deterrence and 
other instrumental factors into account in constitutional interpretation is a complex 
one, well beyond the scope of this Article. I have attempted to be descriptive about 
the extent to which the Court has done so in the § 1983 and Bivens settings. Richard 
Fallon has argued that it is entirely appropriate to take such considerations into 
account for the purpose of implementing the Constitution and that the Court has 
frequently done so. See RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., IMPLEMENTING THE CONSTITUTION 
(2001).  
 I have some doubts about the soundness of emphasizing over-deterrence in 
connection with § 1983 and Bivens causes of action against individuals because, 
among other things, it amounts to double-counting: once for the constitutional 
merits and again for the individual immunity inquiry.  
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Twombly52 beyond antitrust to include § 1983 and Bivens claims. Even 
though Iqbal applies to all federal court pleading, I want to note in 
particular the Court’s emphasis in Iqbal on the heavy burden of discovery 
on defendants in constitutional tort litigation and its adverse effect on 
independent decision-making by government officials.53 Recall that this 
burden has traditionally played (and still plays) a prominent role in a 
quite different setting—the affirmative defenses of absolute and qualified 
immunity. In marked contrast, the Court in Iqbal emphasized this 
concern with over-deterrence in order to justify the creation of what is 
effectively a heightened pleading requirement in § 1983 and Bivens cases 
(although the Court refused to call it that).54 In my view, it is likely that 
Iqbal’s “plausibility” pleading standard will be applied with extra bite in 
constitutional tort cases against individual defendants. Indeed, that is 
precisely the message that Iqbal was intended to send to district courts 
and the circuits. This is so even if it turns out that Leatherman v. Tarrant 
County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, which rejected a 
heightened pleading requirement for § 1983 claims against local 
governments (which are not protected by qualified immunity), remains 
good law.55 
Iqbal, of course, did much more than this to § 1983 and Bivens 
claims. It also declared that supervisory liability could not be based on 
supervisors’ actual knowledge of unconstitutional conduct and deliberate 
indifference to it.56 Rather, the Court insisted, as a matter of statutory 
interpretation under § 1983, and of federal common law under Bivens, 
that a supervisor himself or herself must violate a plaintiff’s constitutional 
rights in order to be liable for damages.57 It did so primarily because of its 
concern with over-deterrence and the costs of defense, including the 
burden of discovery.58 
 
52 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1965–66 (2007). 
53 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1953 (2009). 
54 Id. at 1953–54. 
55 Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 
507 U.S. 163, 166, 168 (1993) (discussed at 2 CIVIL LIBERTIES LITIGATION, supra note 2, 
§ 6:15). 
56 Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1948.  
57 Id. at 1949. 
58 “If a Government official is to devote time to his or her duties, and to the 
formulation of sound and responsible policies, it is counterproductive to require the 
substantial diversion that is attendant to participating in litigation and making 
informed decisions as to how it should proceed.” Id. at 1953. While this statement was 
made in connection with pleading, concern with the over-deterrence of “high-level 
officials who must be neither deterred nor detracted from the vigorous performance 
of their duties” permeates the entire decision. Id. at 1954. 
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III. IQBAL, OVER-DETERRENCE AND SUPERVISORY LIABILITY 
A. The Iqbal Decision  
Once the Court in Iqbal finished addressing the pleading issue in the 
abstract, it turned to the precise case before it. The plaintiff, alleging 
purposeful discrimination on the basis of race, religion, and ethnic 
origin in connection with the conditions of his confinement, claimed 
that defendants, Ashcroft and Mueller, actually knew that their 
subordinates engaged in such discrimination and were deliberately 
indifferent to it.59 Finding that the plaintiff’s allegations of such actual 
knowledge and deliberate indifference were insufficient for supervisory 
liability under Bivens, the Court simply asserted that inasmuch as 
respondeat superior liability was not permitted under either § 1983 or 
Bivens—a recurring theme in § 1983 jurisprudence—supervisory liability 
required more than these allegations.60 “Because vicarious liability is 
inapplicable to Bivens and § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that each 
Government-official defendant, through the official’s own individual 
actions, has violated the Constitution.”61 In short, applying the 
constitutional approach, the Court declared that a plaintiff claiming 
supervisory liability had to allege and prove that the defendants 
personally violated the plaintiff’s constitutional rights. “Absent vicarious 
liability, each Government official, his or her title notwithstanding, is 
only liable for his or her own misconduct.”62 
Consequently, because the constitutional violations asserted against 
Ashcroft and Mueller in Iqbal required their own purposeful 
discrimination based on race, religion, and national origin, the plaintiff’s 
pleadings alleging only actual knowledge and deliberate indifference on 
their part were insufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss. According 
to the Court, which thereby rejected the causation approach, supervisory 
liability was “a misnomer”: what was crucial for supervisory liability was 
the requisite state of mind for the underlying constitutional violation, 
namely, invidious purposeful discrimination by the two supervisors.63 As 
justification for its determination that purposeful discrimination was 
required for supervisory liability and that plaintiff’s allegations were 
insufficient, the Court once more emphasized the costs of discovery and 
 
59 Id. at 1944. 
60 Id. at 1948. The Court’s continuing rejection of § 1983 respondeat superior 
liability stems from the seminal decision of Monell v. Dep’t of Social Services, which 
adopted an official policy or custom requirement for local government liability. 436 
U.S. 658, 694 (1978). For criticism of the Monell Court’s reliance on § 1983’s 
“subjects, or causes to be subjected” language for its rejection of respondeat superior 
liability for local governments, see 2 CIVIL LIBERTIES LITIGATION, supra note 2, §§ 6:5–
6:6. As observed there, this is a question of Congressional intent, not Congressional 
power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. § 6:6 & n.9. 
61 Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1948. 
62 Id. at 1949. 
63 Id. 
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its adverse impact on the decision-making of high-ranking executive 
officials.64 It also rejected the case-management approach that had been 
suggested by the Second Circuit in Iqbal as a method of addressing the 
concern with over-deterrence.65  
Justice Souter, the author of Twombly, dissented at some length, 
joined by Justices Stevens, Ginsburg and Breyer.66 He criticized the 
majority for the way it applied Twombly.67 But he appeared to be equally 
distressed by the Court’s approach to supervisory liability.68 Indeed, he 
contended that the Court had effectively eliminated supervisory liability 
under Bivens: “Lest there be any mistake, in these words [‘the term 
“supervisory liability” is a misnomer’] the majority is not narrowing the 
scope of supervisory liability; it is eliminating Bivens supervisory liability 
entirely.”69 He complained that the defendants had conceded on the 
record that supervisory liability could be based on actual knowledge of 
unconstitutional conduct and deliberate indifference to that conduct.70 
What the Court did was thus unfair to the plaintiff because of the 
absence of any opportunity to address the supervisory liability issue. In 
addition, he maintained that there was a plausible middle position 
between respondeat superior liability and the constitutional approach, as 
demonstrated by the consensus in the circuits.71 The Court had not 
seriously considered this possibility because it did not have the benefit of 
briefing and argument on the proper standard of supervisory liability.72 
Justice Souter went on to suggest that the Court would have reached 
the same result—that plaintiff did not state a Bivens supervisory liability 
claim against the defendants—even under an actual knowledge and 
deliberate indifference standard for supervisory liability.73 In all 
likelihood, he was attempting to render as dicta the Court’s discussion 
and adoption of the constitutional approach to supervisory liability. 
B. Pre-Iqbal Law in the Circuits 
Whatever one thinks should be the proper standard for supervisory 
liability, it is surprising from a process perspective that the Court 
announced that it was adopting the constitutional approach to 
 
64 Id. at 1953. 
65 Id. 
66 Id. at 1954–61 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
67 Id. at 1955.  
68 Id. at 1955–57. 
69 Id. at 1957. Interestingly, Justice Souter’s discussion implied that the Court’s 
adoption of the constitutional approach to supervisory liability did not necessarily 
apply to § 1983, despite the fact that the Court repeatedly discussed § 1983 and Bivens 
together. 
70 Id. at 1956. 
71 This middle position is the causation approach under which supervisory 
liability can be based on actual knowledge and deliberate indifference. Id. at 1958. 
72 Id. at 1957. 
73 Id. at 1958. 
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supervisory liability under circumstances of no briefing and no argument. 
This is particularly troubling because the circuits for the most part 
adopted the causation approach. At the very least, the Court should have 
explained itself much more than it did. 
As Justice Souter indicated in his dissent, the circuits staked out a 
position on supervisory liability somewhere between respondeat superior 
liability and Iqbal’s constitutional approach. Most, perhaps all, of the 
circuits agreed that actual knowledge of unconstitutional conduct by 
subordinates and deliberate indifference to it were sufficient for 
supervisory liability.74 Some went further and appeared to allow 
supervisory liability for gross negligence even in the absence of actual 
knowledge.75 But those decisions allowing supervisory liability for gross 
negligence are questionable even under the causation approach. They 
are inconsistent with the Court’s local government liability for failure to 
train decision in City of Canton v. Harris, which set out a deliberate 
indifference standard for local government failure to train liability as a 
statutory matter.76 As the Third Circuit reasoned two decades before 
Iqbal, it was confident that after Harris “the standard of individual liability 
for supervisory public officials will be found to be no less stringent than 
the standard of liability for the public entities that they serve.”77 In both 
 
74 E.g., Blyden v. Mancusi, 186 F.3d 252, 262 (2d Cir. 1999); Johnson v. Martin, 
195 F.3d 1208, 1219–20 (10th Cir. 1999); Boyd v. Knox, 47 F.3d 966, 968 (8th Cir. 
1995); Doe v. Taylor Indep. Sch. Dist., 15 F.3d 443, 453 (5th Cir. 1994); Shaw v. 
Stroud, 13 F.3d 791, 799 (4th Cir. 1994); Manarite v. City of Springfield, 957 F.2d 953, 
957 (1st Cir. 1992); Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1479–80 (3d Cir. 
1990). See generally 1 CIVIL LIBERTIES LITIGATION, supra note 2, §§ 3:100–3:103 (listing a 
collection of cases from the various circuits regarding supervisory liability). 
75 This was noted by Justice Souter in his dissent, Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1958.  
In Iqbal, the plaintiff pleaded at least actual knowledge on the part of the defendants 
who allegedly “knew of, condoned, and willfully and maliciously agreed to subject 
plaintiff to these conditions of confinement as a matter of policy, solely on account of 
[his]religion, race and/or national origin for no legitimate penological interest.” 
Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 175 (2d Cir. 2007).  
 However, the Second Circuit had previously declared that gross negligence was 
one of five ways of showing supervisory liability. Hernandez v. Keane, 341 F.3d 137 
(2d Cir. 2003). It restated this in Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d at 152. To the extent that 
gross negligence has an objective “should have known” component, it could be 
understood as constructive notice, thereby explaining the Court’s concern in Iqbal 
with potential respondeat superior liability and the Court’s rejection of the causation 
approach. Indeed, the second Question Presented in the Iqbal defendants’ Petition 
for Writ of Certiorari was the following: “Whether a cabinet-level officer or other 
high-ranking official may be held personally liable for the allegedly unconstitutional 
acts of subordinate officials on the ground that, as high-level supervisors, they had 
constructive notice of the discrimination allegedly carried out by such subordinate 
officials.” Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 3, Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009) 
(No. 07-1015) (emphasis added). 
76 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989). 
77 Sample v. Diecks, 885 F.2d 1099, 1118 (3d Cir. 1989). 
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cases, the proper standard was “deliberate indifference to the plight of 
the person deprived.”78  
As it turns out, the differences in real world impact of the two 
supervisory liability standards—the constitutional and causation 
approaches—are not as straightforward as the Court and even Justice 
Souter made them out to be in Iqbal. But before turning to that, it is 
necessary to analyze § 1983 (and Bivens) supervisory liability at a 
theoretical level.  
IV. THE NATURE OF SUPERVISORY LIABILITY 
A. Constitutional Duty, Causation, and Fault: The Personal Involvement
 Requirement 
It is clear that in order for any defendant, individual or 
governmental, to be liable under § 1983 and Bivens, there must be a 
constitutional duty imposed on the defendant that runs to the plaintiff 
and that is breached by the defendant. This follows from § 1983’s 
“deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the 
Constitution” language as well as from the constitutional violation 
required in Bivens actions. The breach of constitutional duty is also 
normative in that it supplies the requisite threshold fault for § 1983 and 
Bivens liability.79 Next, this breach of constitutional duty must have caused 
the plaintiff’s constitutional injury. The causation requirement follows 
not only from the “subjects, or causes to be subjected” language of § 1983 
but, like fault, from the very notion of tort liability and responsibility as a 
normative matter.80 
Over the years, the Court has put a gloss on causation in § 1983 and 
Bivens cases and has characterized it as imposing a personal involvement 
requirement that precludes respondeat superior liability. This personal 
involvement requirement apparently includes some notion of affirmative 
conduct constituting fault. The Court put it this way in an important 
footnote in Monell v. Dep’t of Social Services: “[W]e would appear to have 
decided that the mere right to control without any control or direction 
having been exercised and without any failure to supervise is not enough 
to support § 1983 liability.”81 According to the Court, then, the mere 
 
78 Id. See also Schneider v. Simonini, 749 A.2d 336, 356 (N.J. 2000) (in a decision 
examining § 1983 supervisory liability doctrine, the New Jersey Supreme Court 
adopted what it called the “intermediate” standard of “recklessness or deliberate 
indifference”). 
79 See generally, Nahmod, Constitutional Damages, supra note 40. 
80 Ernest J. Weinrib, Causation and Wrongdoing, 63 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 407, 408 
(1987). 
81 Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 n.58 (1978) (citing Rizzo v. 
Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976)). As further support for its conclusion, the Court in 
Monell analyzed § 1983’s “subjects, or causes to be subjected” language as precluding 
respondeat superior liability. It reasoned that the two primary policy justifications for 
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failure to act, standing alone, is not enough for § 1983 and Bivens liability 
even where there is a causal relation between the failure to act and the 
constitutional injury. The Court’s primary concern was, and continues to 
be, the avoidance of respondeat superior liability.82 
The Court in Iqbal thus articulated a new personal involvement 
requirement for supervisory liability under Bivens when it declared as a 
matter of federal common law that a Bivens defendant must personally 
have violated the plaintiff’s constitutional rights in order to be liable, 
even in a supervisory capacity.83 Causation accompanied by a state of 
mind that is less than the constitutional minimum is insufficient personal 
involvement for supervisory liability. Moreover, in explaining why Iqbal 
also applied to § 1983 (which the Court said it did), the Court simply 
asserted, as it had in Monell with regard to local government liability 
thirty years earlier,84 that the “subjects, or causes to be subjected” 
language precludes respondeat superior liability and therefore means 
that the supervisory § 1983 defendant must personally have violated the 
plaintiff’s constitutional rights.85  
In short, the Court in Iqbal, adopting the constitutional approach, 
interpreted federal common law and § 1983 to require for supervisory 
liability the same state of mind as that for the underlying constitutional 
violation.86 This constitutionally required state of mind, rather than 
actual knowledge and deliberate indifference, now constitutes the 
personal involvement requirement for supervisory liability. Under the 
constitutional approach of Iqbal, then, the supervisory defendant’s fault is 
 
such liability, accident reduction and loss-spreading under an insurance approach, 
had been rejected in the legislative debates on § 1983. Id. at 691–94. 
 In Constitutional Accountability in Section 1983 Litigation, I argued that the official 
policy or custom requirement for § 1983 local government liability is the functional 
equivalent of the personal involvement requirement for § 1983 individual liability. 
Nahmod, Constitutional Accountability, supra note 4, at 24–29. More generally, I argued 
that § 1983 local government liability and individual liability raise constitutional 
accountability questions, the first involving institutional accountability, the second 
involving individual accountability. See id.; discussion infra at Part IV.D. 
82 This is parallel to the Court’s decision in DeShaney v. Winnebago County 
Department of Social Services, which held as a constitutional matter that there is 
generally no affirmative substantive due process duty to protect others from private 
harm: “[N]othing in the Due Process Clause itself requires the State to protect the 
life, liberty, and property of its citizens against invasion by private actors.” 489 U.S. 
189, 195 (1989).  
83 That Iqbal is a personal involvement case involving supervisors is clear from the 
Court’s description of the defendants’ motion to dismiss “for failure to state sufficient 
allegations to show their own involvement in clearly established unconstitutional 
conduct.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1944 (2009). 
84 Monell, 436 U.S. at 691–92.  
85 Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1948. The constitutional approach obviously poses no 
problem in the typical § 1983 and Bivens non-supervisory liability case where 
government officials are sued in their individual capacities for what they have 
themselves done “hands-on” and personally to the plaintiff.  
86 This means that the scope of the § 1983 duty and the Bivens federal common 
law duty is the same as the scope of the underlying constitutional duty.  
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derived from the Constitution alone and not from § 1983 or federal 
common law. In contrast, under the causation approach rejected in Iqbal, 
the supervisory defendant’s fault is derived from § 1983 or federal 
common law.87 
The Court almost surely thought that this new personal involvement 
requirement, based on the underlying constitutional provision, would 
limit the individual damages liability of supervisors generally, and thereby 
reduce over-deterrence not only in equal protection cases like Iqbal but 
also in cases involving other constitutional violations. Conversely, Justice 
Souter in his dissent complained that the Court had effectively 
eliminated supervisory liability.88 However, neither position adequately 
captures the real world impact of the choice between the constitutional 
approach and the causation approach, or the theoretical complexity of 
the issue.89 
B. Real World Impact: Other Hypotheticals 
Equal Protection. What is at stake in terms of real world impact in 
Iqbal’s constitutional approach to supervisory liability and the competing 
causation approach may be illustrated by the following. Recall from the 
first hypothetical at the beginning of this Article that under Iqbal, even 
where subordinates have violated a plaintiff’s constitutional rights, the 
supervisor can only be liable in damages where that supervisor acted with 
the same constitutionally required state of mind. So if, as alleged in Iqbal, 
subordinates have violated equal protection—which requires purposeful 
discrimination—the supervisor is only liable if the failure to supervise was 
accompanied by purposeful discrimination as well. Actual knowledge and 
deliberate indifference are now not enough even though the circuits 
adopted the causation approach pre-Iqbal. Implicit in Iqbal is the 
assessment that the causation approach over-protected constitutional rights. 
It was probably for this reason that the requisite state of mind for 
supervisory liability was ratcheted up in Iqbal.  
Fourth Amendment. Suppose, though, that supervisors are sued under 
§ 1983 for their failure to supervise police officers in making arrests 
where the underlying conduct by subordinates is the use of excessive 
 
87 Under the causation approach there must therefore be a constitutional 
violation by a subordinate. 
88 Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1957. 
89 In contrast to the hypotheticals in Part IV.B, there is little difficulty where a 
subordinate executes what turns out to be a supervisor’s unconstitutional order but 
does not himself or herself violate the plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Suppose, for 
example, that a supervisor, acting on the basis of an impermissible racial motivation, 
directs a subordinate to fire the plaintiff, and the subordinate, without knowing or 
having any reason to suspect the supervisor’s motive, simply follows orders. Here, it is 
only the supervisor, not the subordinate, who violated the plaintiff’s equal protection 
rights and would be liable under § 1983 or Bivens. Both the constitutionally required 
state of mind (or fault) and causation are directly traceable to the supervisor, even 
though the subordinate’s conduct also played a causal role.  
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force in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The constitutionally 
applicable state of mind is objective unreasonableness.90 Under Iqbal the 
supervisors should be liable if they acted in an objectively unreasonable 
way in failing to supervise. Before Iqbal they would have been liable only 
if they acted with deliberate indifference, thereby arguably under-
protecting Fourth Amendment rights. Because objective unreasonableness 
is a lower and less culpable state of mind than deliberate indifference, 
Iqbal may have expanded the scope of supervisory liability in the Fourth 
Amendment setting by adopting the constitutional approach and 
rejecting the causation approach, a result the Court may not have 
foreseen and almost certainly did not intend.91 
It is, of course, possible—it may even be likely—that the Court, if 
confronted with this situation, would impose a very strict proximate cause 
requirement for supervisory liability, just as it did for local government 
liability for hiring decisions in Board of County Commissioners v. Brown.92 
Consider the Brown proximate cause requirement:  
Only where adequate scrutiny of an applicant’s background would 
lead a reasonable policymaker to conclude that the plainly obvious 
consequence of the decision to hire the applicant would be the 
deprivation of a third party’s federally protected right can the 
official’s failure to adequately scrutinize the applicant’s background 
constitute “deliberate indifference.”93  
Even though the Court articulated this strict proximate cause 
requirement in the context of hiring decisions by local governments, it 
turns out that it has been applied by the circuits in other local 
government liability cases going well beyond hiring.94 If applied to the 
Fourth Amendment hypothetical, this strict proximate cause 
requirement could similarly condition supervisory liability on whether 
the particular Fourth Amendment violation was the plainly obvious 
consequence of the supervisor’s own objective unreasonableness. 
Eighth Amendment and Substantive Due Process. Regardless of the 
Court’s eventual proximate cause analysis in supervisory liability cases 
involving Fourth Amendment violations by subordinates, it should be 
noted that there are situations where the choice between Iqbal’s 
constitutional approach and the causation approach may not make much 
real world difference. For example, suppose that supervisors are sued for 
 
90 Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 388 (1989). 
91 Note, however, that this result is not over-protective of Fourth Amendment 
rights, because there is a perfect fit (apart from immunities) between the supervisor’s 
Fourth Amendment fault and the supervisor’s damages liability. To put this in 
another way, the constitutional approach neither under-protects nor over-protects 
constitutional rights. 
92 520 U.S. 397 (1997). 
93 Id. at 411 (emphasis added). 
94 See generally 2 CIVIL LIBERTIES LITIGATION, supra note 2, §§ 6:44–6:48 (listing a 
collection of federal and state cases addressing sufficiency of evidence for failure to 
train, supervise, or hire). 
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the Eighth Amendment or substantive due process violations of their 
subordinates. If the constitutionally required state of mind for both of 
these underlying constitutional violations by the subordinates is 
deliberate indifference, it should make no difference to the outcome 
whether the constitutional approach or the causation approach is 
followed.95 Supervisory liability still would require deliberate indifference 
by the supervisors, whether it is the constitutional or causation approach 
that is applied, in conjunction with the unconstitutional deliberate 
indifference of the subordinates. 
C. The Constitutional Approach: Legislative History, the Language of § 1983,
 and Policy Considerations 
The choice between the constitutional approach and the causation 
approach is not one of Congressional power.96 Congress surely has the 
power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to enact a statute 
such as § 1983 that incorporates the causation approach. The question is 
one of Congressional intent with regard to supervisory liability: does 
§ 1983 create a Fourteenth Amendment damages action that is strictly 
limited to the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment (including 
incorporated provisions of the Bill of Rights) such that a supervisory 
defendant must always himself or herself violate the Fourteenth 
Amendment in order to be liable in damages? Or does it create a 
damages action that, while requiring a constitutional violation by a 
subordinate, nevertheless provides for the damages liability of a 
supervisory defendant causally (and somehow culpably) responsible for a 
subordinate’s constitutional violation irrespective of the underlying 
constitutional provision?  
Legislative History. Although the legislative history of § 1983 does not 
explicitly address the issue, it is at least suggestive of the constitutional 
approach. Section 1983 is described as a statute that “reenact[s] the 
Constitution” by Senator Edmunds.97 Representative Bingham, the 
author of Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment, states that the 
 
95 A caveat: “deliberate indifference” may mean different things depending on 
the particular constitutional provision involved and on who is violating it. According 
to the Court in Farmer v. Brennan, deliberate indifference of individuals for Eighth 
Amendment purposes is subjective criminal recklessness as used in criminal law, while 
deliberate indifference of local governments for failure to train liability is objective in 
nature because it focuses on the state of mind of a governmental entity. 511 U.S. 825, 
839–42 (1994). However, in light of the Court’s references to abuse of government 
power and “the element of arbitrary conduct shocking to the conscience” in County of 
Sacramento v. Lewis, deliberate indifference of individuals for substantive due process 
purposes will likely turn out to be similar, if not identical, to the subjective criminal 
recklessness of Farmer in cases not involving high-speed police chases. 523 U.S. 833, 
836, 845–46 (1998). 
96 Just as Congressional power to impose respondeat superior liability on local 
governments was not at issue in Monell. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 
662–64 (1978). See infra note 117 and accompanying text. 
97 CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 569 (1871). 
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purpose of § 1983 is “the enforcement . . . of the Constitution on behalf 
of every individual citizen of the Republic . . . to the extent of the rights 
guarantied [sic] to him by the Constitution.”98 Senator Thurman, a critic, 
describes § 1983 as “authoriz[ing] any person who is deprived of any 
right, privilege, or immunity secured to him by the Constitution of the 
United States, to bring an action against the wrongdoer in the Federal 
Courts.”99 These portions of the legislative history support the 
constitutional approach to the extent that they can plausibly be read for 
the proposition that § 1983’s scope is identical to the scope of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.100  
This interpretation of the legislative history is consistent with the 
Court’s seminal decision in Monroe v. Pape, which determined that 
§ 1983’s “color of law” language was not narrower in scope than the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s state action requirement.101 More directly, the 
Court in Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co. observed: “The history of the Act is 
replete with statements indicating that Congress thought it was creating a 
remedy as broad as the protection that the Fourteenth Amendment 
affords the individual.”102 
Statutory Language. Similarly, the relevant language of § 1983 tends to 
support the constitutional approach, although it, like the legislative 
history, is not conclusive. This language renders liable in damages any 
person who “subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen . . . to the 
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the 
Constitution and laws.”103 In support of the constitutional approach, the 
“subjects, or causes to be subjected” language is intended simply to cover 
those situations in which defendants either personally, or through 
intervening actors, causally bring about constitutional deprivations. It has 
no other meaning than this. Indeed, earlier examples of this usage 
indicate that this was all that was intended by such language.104  
 
98 CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. at 81 (1871). 
99 CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. at 216 (1871). 
100 On the other hand, they can also be read as indicating only that § 1983 is not 
narrower in scope than the Fourteenth Amendment, which is consistent with the 
causation approach. See Nahmod, Constitutional Accountability, supra note 4, at 18–19 
(discussing portions of the legislative history and related considerations). 
101 365 U.S. 167, 172 (1961). 
102 457 U.S. 922, 934 (1982). 
103 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006). 
104 Preliminary research into this and similar statutory language has uncovered 
the following examples which indicate that § 1983’s “causes, or subjects to be caused” 
language was intended solely as a formal matter to include both personal, hands-on 
causation and causation through intervening actors. 
 (1). The debates of the 39th Congress, leading to the passage of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1866, contained this section 8: 
Sec. 8. And be it further enacted, That any person who, under color of any State or 
local law, ordinance, police, or other regulation or custom, shall, in any State or 
district in which the ordinary course of judicial proceedings has been 
interrupted by the rebellion, subject or cause to be subjected, any negro, mulatto, 
freedman, refugee, or other person, on account of race or color, or any previous 
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condition of slavery or involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime 
whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, or for any other cause, to the 
deprivation of any civil right secured to white persons, or to any other or different 
punishment than white persons are subject to for the commission of like acts or 
offenses, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and be punished by fine not 
exceeding $1,000, or imprisonment not exceeding one year, or both . . . .  
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 211 & 318 (1866) (second and third emphasis 
added). 
 (2). Later in that same congressional session, Senator James Doolittle of 
Wisconsin, introduced a bill pursuant to Section 2 of the 13th Amendment. That bill 
contained the “subject, or cause to be subjected” language, along with several other 
instances of “or cause to be”: 
Sec. 3. And be it further enacted, That any person who shall unlawfully, and in 
violation of the said thirteenth amendment to the Constitution, and of the 
provision of this act, restrain, or cause to be restrained of his or her liberty, with 
intent to subject, or cause to be subjected, or to hold, or to cause to be held, to service as 
a slave, or involuntary servant, any person, shall be deemed guilty of a 
misdemeanor, and on conviction shall be punished by fine not exceeding 
$1,000, or imprisonment not exceeding one year, or both, in the discretion of 
the court. 
Sec. 4. And be it further enacted, That any person who shall unlawfully, and in 
violation of the provisions of the said thirteenth amendment to the Constitution 
and the provisions of this act, restrain or cause to be restrained of his or her liberty, 
with intent to hold or cause to be held to service as a slave or involuntary servant, 
any person who has heretofore been held to slavery or involuntary servitude 
under the laws of any State or Territory, and has been emancipated by the said 
thirteenth amendment to the Constitution, commonly called a freedman, shall, 
in addition to the pains and penalties provided in the last preceding section of 
this act, be liable to be prosecuted by the person injured, who shall be entitled to 
recover the sum of $1,000 . . . . 
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1805 (1866) (second, third, and fifth emphasis 
added). 
 This wording was likely intended to be parallel to an 1806 House Bill prohibiting 
the importation of slaves into the United States and Territories. This bill may be the 
first appearance of the “or cause to be” language in federal legislation, and is similarly 
related to the issue of slaves and freedmen. (For what appears to be the first 
appearance of the “or cause to be” language in state legislation, see Prigg v. 
Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539, 543–44 (1842), which discusses a 1780 
Pennsylvania statute entitled “An act for the gradual abolition of slavery.”). The 
relevant portion of the Bill read:  
And if any person or persons shall, after the said thirty-first day of December, 
transport or bring, or cause to be transported or brought into the United States, or the 
territories thereof, any negro, mulatto, or person of color, contrary to the true 
intent and meaning of this act, every person or persons, so offending, shall be 
guilty of high misdemeanor, and being convicted before any Court having 
competent jurisdiction shall suffer imprisonment not more than ten, nor less 
than five years. 
16 ANNALS OF CONG. 231–32 (1806) (emphasis added). 
 (3). The phrase “or cause to be” was used by legislators beginning in 1775. This 
may indicate that it was imported into the Civil Rights Act of 1866, and then the Civil 
Rights Act of 1871 (and § 1983), simply as a matter of form. The following are some 
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Of course, it could be argued in support of the causation approach 
that the clause “or causes to be subjected” was specifically intended to 
cover those defendants such as supervisors who do not personally and in 
a hands-on way violate a plaintiff’s constitutional rights and to subject 
them to a state of mind, or fault, requirement different from that 
imposed on defendants who do so personally.105 But this statutory 
 
representative examples (with emphasis added) of when the phrase “or cause to be” 
was used: 
(a)  In the Secret Committee Minutes of Proceedings of October 25, 1775, the 
document used the phrase “sell or cause to be sold.” Secret Committee Minutes of 
Proceedings (Oct. 25, 1775), in 2 LETTERS OF DELEGATES TO CONGRESS 253, 254 
(Paul H. Smith ed. 1775). 
(b)  In the Instruction to the commanders of private ships or vessels of war 
authorizing them to capture British vessels and cargos, there was stated what to 
do with captured documents: “you shall deliver, or cause to be delivered, to the judge 
or judges, all passes, sea-briefs, charter-parties, bills of lading, cockets, letters, 
and other documents and writing found on board . . . .” Instructions to the 
commanders of private ships or vessels of war (1776), in 4 JOURNALS OF THE 
CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1774–1789, at 253, 254 (Worthington Chauncey Ford 
ed., 1906). 
(c)  Following the reception of two letters from General Washington, the 
Continental Congress passed a resolution for the safety council of Pennsylvania 
requesting in part, “That the Secret Committee be directed to appoint one or 
more trusty persons, to proceed immediately to the eastern states, and see that 
the cloathing [sic] and stores, which have been ordered to be purchased for the 
army, be collected and forwarded to the army, with all possible despatch [sic]; 
and that the said person, or persons, have power to purchase, or cause to be 
purchased, such necessary cloathing as can be procured in those states, and to 
have them forwarded to the army.” Resolution of Dec. 1, 1776, in 6 JOURNALS OF 
THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1774–1789, at 997. 
(d)  The Committee on Deserters of 1777 issued a report for the Continental 
Congress’s consideration on a resolution authorizing “any constable, freeholder, 
or Keeper of any public ferry within the United States, to apprehend or cause to be 
apprehended, any person being a deserter, and cause such person to be brought 
before any Justice of the peace . . . .” Report of Committee on Deserters (1777), in 7 
JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1774–1789, at 115–16. 
(e)  A letter from Pennsylvania appointing delegates to the Continental Congress 
stated, “We, reposing especial Trust and Confidence in your Prudence, Integrity, 
and Abilities, do by these presents constitute and appoint you . . . to be our 
Counsellors [sic] and Agents . . . . Hereby ratifying and confirming all and 
whatsoever you our said Counsellors, Agents and Solicitor shall lawfully do or 
cause to be done, touching or concerning the said Cause between the said States of 
Pennsylvania and Connecticut.” Pennsylvania’s Credentials of Delegates (1782), in 22 
JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1774–1789, at 345, 346 (Gaillard 
Hunt ed., 1914). 
(f)  In the years following, the phrase was used mostly in connection with payment 
(“pay or cause to be paid”) or delivery (“deliver or cause to be delivered”). 
105 See Kit Kinports, The Buck Does Not Stop Here: Supervisory Liability in Section 1983 
Cases, 1997 U. ILL. L. REV. 147 (1997). Kit Kinports has argued in favor of the 
causation approach (she did not call it that) with negligence as the requirement for 
supervisory liability. She contended that my constitutional approach is not justified by 
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language on its face addresses only causation and says nothing about any 
supervisory liability state of mind requirement. In contrast, under the 
constitutional approach this omission is not problematic if “or causes to 
be subjected” is interpreted together with § 1983’s “deprivation of any 
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution” language. It 
is the underlying constitutional provision that supplies the requisite state 
of mind, or fault, for all § 1983 defendants, whether supervisors or other 
individuals, regardless of whether any of them personally violated a 
plaintiff’s constitutional rights or, through intervening actors, caused 
that constitutional violation.  
After all, these defendants are all suable “persons” within the 
meaning of § 1983’s “Every person . . . shall be liable” language. Everyone 
would agree that the fault of an individual defendant—a “person”—who 
personally violates a plaintiff’s constitutional rights is derived from the 
underlying constitutional provision. Why should supervisors be treated 
differently in this regard?106 There is no persuasive justification for having 
different standards of fault for different “persons” that are dependent on 
the causal manner in which they were responsible for the constitutional 
violation.  
Moreover, Parratt v. Taylor107 has conventionally been interpreted as 
holding that § 1983 has no state of mind requirement for the prima facie 
case as a matter of statutory interpretation.108 True, the Court could 
simply have announced in Iqbal that deliberate indifference is the state of 
mind required for supervisory liability, just as it did—incorrectly, in my 
view—in connection with local government liability for failure to train in 
City of Canton v. Harris.109 But there is no sound reason to do so in light of 
§ 1983’s legislative history and, especially, its language: the requisite state 
of mind, or fault, can readily be grounded on the relevant constitutional 
provision, as it is under the constitutional approach. This is a 
straightforward resolution of the statutory interpretation issue because 
 
the causation language of § 1983. She also maintained that the constitutional 
approach effectively “moots” supervisory liability where subordinates violate a 
plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Id. at 161 n.71. As to § 1983’s language, my analysis 
appears in the text and accompanying footnotes. As to mooting supervisory liability, I 
demur. The issue in dispute is where the state of mind requirement, or fault, comes 
from: from the relevant constitutional provision or from § 1983 itself. Under the 
constitutional approach, supervisory liability is still with us. 
106 Or, for that matter, local governments. See discussion infra at Part IV.D. 
107 451 U.S. 527 (1981). 
108 See, e.g., Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 329–30 (1986); Greenwich Citizens 
Comm., Inc. v. Counties of Warren, 77 F.3d 26, 30 (2d Cir. 1996); Pink v. Lester, 52 
F.3d 73, 74 (4th Cir. 1995). 
109 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989). In Harris the Court, effectively adopting the 
causation approach, determined as a matter of statutory interpretation that 
deliberate indifference (together with causation) is required for local government 
liability for failure to train. See discussion infra at Part IV.D. 
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the fit between the constitutional violation, fault, and damages liability is 
perfect.110 
Of course, this argument from the legislative history and language of 
§ 1983 in favor of the constitutional approach does not apply to Bivens 
actions. Strictly speaking, then, the Court was free in Iqbal to adopt the 
causation approach to supervisory liability as a matter of federal common 
law. However, the Court did not do so; instead, it adopted the 
constitutional approach for Bivens supervisory liability claims. At the same 
time, it made clear that Iqbal governs § 1983 supervisory liability as well.111  
Policy Considerations. Many have extensively discussed the policy 
considerations underlying § 1983 elsewhere.112 I will therefore be terse. 
Simply put, I submit that the constitutional approach provides a better fit 
between § 1983’s policy considerations and damages liability for 
Fourteenth Amendment violations. 
The primary policies underlying § 1983 damages liability are 
compensation and deterrence.113 Because the causation approach seems 
to expand the scope of supervisory liability more than the constitutional 
approach, and therefore beyond the scope of the Fourteenth 
Amendment itself (although a constitutional violation by a subordinate is 
always required), it would appear that § 1983’s compensation and 
deterrence policies are better promoted by the causation approach.  
However, it may not be that simple. Recall the earlier hypotheticals. 
To the extent that the causation approach tends to expand the scope of 
supervisory liability to cover cases involving constitutional provisions 
requiring more than deliberate indifference (as in Iqbal itself), then the 
compensation and deterrence policies of § 1983 are promoted. Indeed, 
the Iqbal Court would probably characterize this as over-protecting 
constitutional rights. On the other hand, the causation approach may 
tend to limit the scope of supervisory liability in cases involving 
constitutional provisions requiring less than deliberate indifference, 
 
110 Apart from immunities, of course. 
111 Recall that Justice Souter in his Iqbal dissent did his best to treat the Court’s 
supervisory liability discussion as grounded on Bivens and not § 1983. See supra note 
69 and accompanying text. Thus, Iqbal could conceivably be limited to supervisory 
liability Bivens actions. But it is difficult to believe, particularly in light of the Court’s 
repeated assertions in Iqbal and elsewhere that the jurisprudence of Bivens and § 1983 
is fundamentally the same (except for § 1983 local government liability), that the 
Court would ever buy into such a dual view of Bivens and § 1983 supervisory liability 
actions. 
112 See, e.g, Harry A. Blackmun, Section 1983 and Federal Protection of Individual 
Rights—Will the Statute Remain Alive or Fade Away?, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (1985); John C. 
Jeffries, Jr., Damages for Constitutional Violations: The Relation of Risk to Injury in 
Constitutional Torts, 75 VA. L. REV. 1461 (1989); Nahmod, Courtroom to Street, supra note 
32; Nahmod, Constitutional Damages, supra note 40; Sheldon H. Nahmod, Section 1983 
and the “Background” of Tort Liability, 50 IND. L.J. 5 (1974); Christina B. Whitman, 
Government Responsibility for Constitutional Torts, 85 MICH. L. REV. 225 (1986). See also 1 
CIVIL LIBERTIES LITIGATION, supra note 2, §§ 1:5–1:9. 
113 There is also a punitive function with regard to individual defendants who can 
be liable for punitive damages. See supra note 24. 
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especially in Fourth Amendment cases, thereby possibly under-protecting 
them. In such cases, then, where plaintiffs are not able to prove 
deliberate indifference, plaintiffs will lose against the supervisors under 
the causation approach whereas they would have won under the 
constitutional approach if they could prove objectively unreasonable 
behavior, a lesser requirement, on the part of supervisors.114 
In contrast to these instances of possible over- and under-protection 
of constitutional rights under the causation approach, the constitutional 
approach neither over- nor under-protects. The requisite constitutional 
state of mind, or fault, is intimately connected to the potential damages 
liability (apart from immunities) for violating the underlying 
constitutional provision. The constitutional approach thus directly 
promotes § 1983’s policies of compensation and deterrence for 
Fourteenth Amendment violations.115 It situates the state of mind, or 
fault, requirement in the underlying constitutional provision itself, which 
is appropriate for a statute that was enacted under § 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to enforce § 1. 
Finally, another advantage of the constitutional approach for 
supervisory liability is that it simplifies what would otherwise be a 
complicated qualified immunity inquiry. Consider that, under the 
causation approach, the qualified immunity inquiry must take account 
not only of the constitutional norm applicable to the subordinate but 
also the deliberate indifference of the supervisor. The First Circuit 
described it this way: 
When a supervisor seeks qualified immunity in a section 1983 
action, the “clearly established” prong of the qualified immunity 
inquiry is satisfied when (1) the subordinate’s actions violated a 
clearly established constitutional right, and (2) it was clearly 
established that a supervisor would be liable for constitutional 
violations perpetrated by his subordinates in that context. In other 
words, for a supervisor to be liable there must be a bifurcated 
“clearly established” inquiry—one branch probing the underlying 
violation, and the other probing the supervisor’s potential 
liability.116 
In contrast, under the constitutional approach, the first part of the 
qualified immunity inquiry focuses on whether the supervisor violated 
the plaintiff’s constitutional rights. The second part of the qualified 
immunity inquiry focuses on whether the supervisor violated clearly 
established constitutional law at the time of his or her conduct. Both 
 
114 Of course, even apart from or in addition to supervisory liability, a plaintiff 
can also sue the subordinate who violated his or her constitutional rights personally 
under § 1983 or Bivens. 
115 See Nahmod, Constitutional Accountability, supra note 4, at 19–22. 
116 Camilo-Robles v. Hoyos, 151 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 1998) (citations omitted). 
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parts appropriately are inquiries into the constitutional norm applicable to 
the defendant’s conduct, though at different times.117 
For all of these reasons, then—§ 1983’s suggestive legislative history, 
its “or causes to be subjected” language, relevant policy considerations, 
the straightforward nature of the constitutional approach, and the ease 
of application of the constitutional approach for qualified immunity 
purposes—the Court’s adoption of the constitutional approach for 
supervisory liability in Iqbal was sound. This is so despite the fact that the 
Court did this without briefing and argument and in the face of 
defendants’ concession to the contrary. 
However, there is one more issue to address, and it is a serious one. 
In Harris, the Court expressly adopted the causation approach to local 
government liability for failure to train.118 Can this be squared with its 
adoption of the constitutional approach to supervisory liability in Iqbal?  
D. The Constitutional Approach: Iqbal’s Inconsistency with § 1983 Local
 Government Liability for Failure to Train 
The Court got supervisory liability right in Iqbal when it adopted the 
constitutional approach. In contrast, the Court incorrectly addressed 
local government liability for failure to train in the seminal decision of 
City of Canton v. Harris.119 In Harris, the Court did not even nod in the 
direction of Parratt v.Taylor,120 which, it will be recalled, declared that 
§ 1983 contains no state of mind requirement for the prima facie case as 
a matter of statutory interpretation.121 It also paid little attention to 
statements in prior cases indicating that local government liability was 
premised on the unconstitutional conduct of the local government 
 
117 It should also be noted that the constitutional approach to supervisory liability 
simplifies the policymaker inquiry for local government liability purposes. In Monell v. 
Dep’t of Social Services, the Court declared that local government liability requires that 
the “execution of a government’s policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or 
by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury.” 
436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978) (emphasis added). Suppose that a high-ranking official, 
identified as a policymaker (a matter of state and local law), is a supervisor. Under 
the constitutional approach, it is only when he or she is found to have engaged in 
unconstitutional conduct that the conduct is properly attributed to the local 
government for local government liability purposes (even though the policymaker 
may also be liable personally). See Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 737 
(1989); City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 121–22 (1988); Pembaur v. City 
of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 480 (1986). See generally 2 CIVIL LIBERTIES LITIGATION, 
supra note 2, §§ 6:23–6:31 (analysis of Supreme Court cases on § 1983 and 
policymakers). 
118 City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989). 
119 Id. Before Harris was handed down, I argued in favor of the constitutional 
approach to the official policy or custom requirement for local government liability. 
Nahmod, Constitutional Accountability, supra note 4, at 24–29. 
120 See Harris, 489 U.S. 378. 
121 Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 543 (1981). 
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itself.122 Instead, the Court unambiguously declared in Harris that the 
deliberate indifference requirement for local government failure to train 
liability is a matter of statutory interpretation, independent of the 
underlying constitutional violation.123 In other words, the state of mind 
required of the local government, or fault, comes from § 1983 itself.  
In so doing, the Court was able to finesse the question of the state of 
mind required for the underlying substantive due process violation, 
namely, the alleged failure by police officers to provide medical care to 
the plaintiff while she was in police custody. In addition, the Court may 
have had a difficult time in conceptually wrapping its collective mind 
around local government liability where a failure to train is alleged: after 
all, how can a failure to train constitute an official policy or custom?124 
 
122 For example, in Owen v. City of Independence, which held that local 
governments are not protected from § 1983 damages liability by qualified immunity, 
the Court referred to injuries being occasioned by a local government’s 
“unconstitutional conduct,” and held that local governments have “no immunity 
from damages liability flowing from their constitutional violations.” 445 U.S. 622, 650, 
657 (1980). And in Polk County v. Dodson, the Court held that allegations of 
unconstitutional conduct against a county and its board of supervisors did not make 
out a prima facie § 1983 claim because the plaintiff did not allege “any policy that 
arguably violated his rights under the Sixth, Eighth, or Fourteenth Amendments. . . . 
[A] policy of withdrawal from frivolous cases would not violate the Constitution.” 454 
U.S. 312, 326 (1981). However, neither of these pre-Harris cases involved failure to 
train liability, which could explain why the Court did not mention them in this 
connection. 
123 Harris, 489 U.S. at 388. The Court declared: “We hold today that the 
inadequacy of police training may serve as the basis for § 1983 liability only where the 
failure to train amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom 
the police come into contact.” Id. In a footnote, the Court explained: “The 
‘deliberate indifference’ standard we adopt for § 1983 ‘failure to train’ claims does 
not turn upon the degree of fault (if any) that a plaintiff must show to make out an 
underlying claim of a constitutional violation.” Id. n.8. 
 In Board of County Commissioners v. Brown, the Court read Harris as follows: “We 
held that, quite apart from the state of mind required to establish the underlying 
constitutional violation—in that case, a violation of due process—a plaintiff seeking 
to establish municipal liability on the theory that a facially lawful municipal action has 
led an employee to violate a plaintiff’s rights must demonstrate that the municipal 
action was taken with ‘deliberate indifference’ as to its known or obvious 
consequences. A showing of simple or even heightened negligence will not suffice.” 
520 U.S. 397, 407 (1997) (citation omitted).  
 Ironically, Justice Kennedy, the author of Iqbal, read Harris the same way. See 
County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 856 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
124 Failure to train cases are not pure failure to act cases but rather cases in which 
inadequate training is alleged to have brought about a constitutional violation by local 
government officials or employees. Inadequate training can thus constitute either an 
official policy—the inadequate training program itself is adopted by the local 
government—or a custom of inadequate training apart from what is formally set out by 
the local government regarding training. Similarly, failure to supervise cases are not 
pure failure to act cases but rather cases in which inadequate supervision is alleged to 
have brought about a constitutional violation by local government officials or 
employees. Thus, inadequate supervision can also constitute an official policy or custom 
of the local government. 
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Most of all, the Court imposed a statutory deliberate indifference 
requirement in Harris because it was worried about the specter of § 1983 
respondeat superior liability for local governments, just as it was to be 
worried two decades later in Iqbal about respondeat superior liability for 
supervisors. Why deliberate indifference in particular? Probably because 
this state of mind occupies a middle position between strict liability at 
one extreme and a malicious intent or purpose to cause harm 
requirement at the other.125 Strict liability, and even negligence or gross 
negligence with its accompanying second-guessing by a fact-finder, would 
come dangerously close to respondeat superior liability, which is 
anathema to the Court. And a generally applicable malicious intent or 
purpose to cause harm requirement would be contrary to the Court’s 
Monroe v. Pape “background of tort liability” approach to § 1983 statutory 
interpretation.126 It would also seriously undermine the core purpose of 
§ 1983: the enforcement of the Fourteenth Amendment through 
compensation and deterrence.127 
In the local government failure to train setting, deliberate 
indifference thus serves a gatekeeper function similar to that served by 
the various constitutionally required states of mind described above.128 
Indeed, in further demonstration of this gatekeeper function and the 
continuing judicial aversion to respondeat superior liability in the local 
government liability setting, consider Board of County Commissioners v. 
Brown, which involved a hiring decision by a policymaker.129 Here, the 
Court interpreted its Harris deliberate indifference standard as 
incorporating a very strict proximate cause requirement—the plaintiff’s 
particular constitutional injury must be the “plainly obvious 
consequence” of a city’s inadequate hiring decision—than was contained 
in Harris itself.130 This led the dissenters to argue that the Court had so 
over-reacted to potential respondeat superior liability, and had made 
 
 In order for an official policy or custom to be actionable under the constitutional 
approach through § 1983, I have contended that it must be unconstitutional either 
on its face or as applied by the local government’s officials or employees. See 
Nahmod, Constitutional Accountability, supra note 4, at 24–29; 2 CIVIL LIBERTIES 
LITIGATION, supra note 2, § 6:50. 
125 Compare this with New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 278–80 (1964), 
where the Court, after considering the chilling effect of common law defamation 
rules—including strict liability—on print media, held that public official plaintiffs 
suing print media for defamation in connection with their official conduct had to 
allege and prove at least knowing or reckless falsehood. 
126 365 U.S. 167, 187 (1961) (the Court’s rational for rejecting a specific intent 
requirement for the § 1983 prima facie case was that it “should be read against the 
background of tort liability that makes a man responsible for the natural 
consequences of his actions”). 
127 In contrast, the Court interpreted substantive due process—the relevant 
constitutional provision itself—as requiring purpose to cause harm in the high-speed 
police pursuit setting. Lewis, 523 U.S. at 853–54. See also supra Part II.A. 
128 See Part II.C, supra. 
129 520 U.S. 397, 411 (1997). 
130 Id. 
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§ 1983 local government liability doctrine so arcane, that the Court 
should reconsider its rejection of such liability made in Monell v. Dep’t of 
Social Services.131 
Whatever the Court’s reasons for deciding Harris as it did, thereby 
adopting the causation approach for local government failure to train 
liability, the Court got it wrong. First, as argued earlier, the legislative 
history and language of § 1983, while not conclusive, tend to support the 
constitutional approach, as do the relevant policy considerations.132 
Second, the causation approach, unlike the constitutional approach, 
does not provide the best fit between the local government’s fault and its 
damages liability for the plaintiff’s constitutional deprivation.133  
Furthermore, there is no persuasive justification for applying the 
constitutional approach to all individuals, including supervisors, while at 
the same time applying the causation approach to local governments. This 
improperly bifurcates § 1983: both individuals and local governments are 
“persons” for § 1983 liability purposes and are subject to the same prima 
facie case requirement with regard to the underlying constitutional 
violation.134 As I have argued elsewhere at length, the official policy or 
custom requirement for local government liability should be considered 
the equivalent, for constitutional accountability purposes, of the personal 
involvement requirement for individual liability.135 Both the official policy 
or custom requirement and the personal involvement requirement call 
for a constitutional violation by the local government or individuals 
(including supervisors) sued under § 1983. 
The Court may one day have to confront Iqbal’s inconsistency with 
Harris’s adoption of the causation approach. As things now stand, the 
constitutional approach governs § 1983 and Bivens individual liability 
while the causation approach governs § 1983 local government failure to 
train liability. 
V. CONCLUSION 
I have focused on two aspects of Iqbal in revisiting the choice 
between the constitutional approach and the causation approach. The 
first is the Court’s increasing concern with over-deterrence in the § 1983 
and Bivens setting, a concern that has moved from individual 
immunities—where it has traditionally been located—through the 
underlying constitutional provisions, and has culminated in the 
 
131 Brown, 520 U.S. at 430–31 (Breyer, J., joined by Stevens, J. and Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting) (citing Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978)). 
132 See supra Part IV.C. 
133 See the discussion at Part IV.B of the real world fit between fault and damages 
liability in the supervisory liability setting. I suggested there that the fit is better under 
the constitutional approach. 
134 Immunities are a different matter. 
135 See Nahmod, Constitutional Accountability, supra note 4, at 24–29. See also 2 CIVIL 
LIBERTIES LITIGATION, supra note 2, § 6:50. 
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imposition of a “plausibility” requirement for notice pleading that will 
inevitably be applied to plaintiffs’ complaints with considerable bite in 
§ 1983 and Bivens cases.  
The second is the Court’s adoption in Iqbal of the constitutional 
approach for supervisory liability—one that I previously advocated and 
that I still believe to be sound—and the Court’s rejection of the causation 
approach for supervisory liability. Even though Iqbal inadequately 
analyzed the issue, in the end the Court reached the correct result for 
§ 1983 and Bivens supervisory liability. It brought supervisory liability in 
line with other kinds of individual liability under § 1983 and Bivens. Yet 
the causation approach is the very one that the Court incorrectly adopted 
in Harris for § 1983 local government failure to train liability.136 This 
inconsistency is unfortunate. 
Simply put, § 1983 creates a Fourteenth Amendment damages action 
against state and local government officials and against local 
governments themselves. It is the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
constitutional norms that establish the state of mind, or fault, required of 
“[e]very person” for the § 1983 prima facie case. And it is the content of 
those constitutional norms that should be the threshold consideration in 
addressing the § 1983 prima facie case. 
 
136 And, by implication, for failure to supervise. See supra note 119 and 
accompanying text. 
